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ARIstotle oN PuRe ANd sImPle stuff
Tiberiu Popa
aristotle’s scientific works deserve our attention and reflection for their 
intrinsic merits and revealing limitations just as much as because they clarify 
other facets of the aristotelian corpus and because they significantly shaped 
almost two thousand years of science and of fields bordering on science, such 
as alchemy.1 For all these reasons, then, the Stagirite’s view of the physical world 
deserves to be determined with as much precision as possible. This paper is 
meant to bring aspects of his worldview into sharper focus by attempting 
to reconsider and to clarify a crucial aristotelian notion: the homoeomers. 
a view that has been entertained traditionally by commentators is that the 
four simple bodies in the sublunary world (earth, water, air, and fire) cannot 
exist independently according to aristotle; a consequence of this view is the 
general belief that all homoeomers or uniform bodies have to be compounds.2 
 1 The volume edited by Viano (Viano 2002a) as well as Newman (2006)’s 
reconsideration of the place of alchemy in the context of the scientific 
revolution are substantial contributions to our understanding of the Nachleben 
of Meteorology iV, especially with respect to late ancient, medieval and early 
modern alchemy, and the dawn of chemistry. See also Düring (1944), 10–11.
 2 Olympiodorus (6th c. Platonist), in trying to mark out the thematic scope of 
Meteor. iV, notes that it is not sufficient to consider this book to be about ta 
homoiomerē; instead, we should more strictly define its central topic as the 
homoeomers resulting from the combination of the four so-called elements 
(272.5 ff.). a similar view was defended in modern times. in the first part of 
the 20th century, Joachim, for instance, notes in his commentary on Generation 
and Corruption: ‘in aristotle’s system the homoiomerē are the first, or most 
rudimentary, compound natural bodies (…). Every homoiomeres is a chemical 
compound of the same four “simple” bodies (Earth, air, Fire, Water) or – more 
precisely – of the same four “elementary qualities” (hot, Cold, Dry, Moist). 
The four constituents enter into combination in a determinate quantitative 
proportion, which differs in the different homoiomerē; so that each homoiomeres 
is characterized by its distinctive “combining formula” (logos tēs mixeōs).’ 
 Vii.1 (2010), 29–61
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i would like to suggest that, while aristotle consistently maintains that the 
four basic opposites (hot, cold, moist, dry) cannot exist independently, this 
is not always the case with the four simple bodies.3 My central claim is 
that Meteorology (from now on: Meteor.) iV – aristotle’s ‘chemical treatise’ 
– provides evidence that, contrary to the traditional interpretation of his 
natural philosophy, not all uniform stuffs (ta homoiomerē) are necessarily 
compounds of the four simple bodies or even of just earth and water; indeed, 
some of them consist of only one element: earth or water. This, however, does 
not prevent, for instance, bodies consisting entirely of earth from displaying 
(1926), 64. holmyard (1931), 17, in commenting on GC ii.8, points out that 
‘all other substances [i.e. other than earth, water, air and fire] are composed of 
all the elements or “simple” bodies.’ Düring (1944), 14 too seems to consider as 
indisputable that all homoeomerous bodies are compounds in aristotle’s view. 
Mugler writes in the introduction to his translation (Mugler 1966, xi) that, while 
the phusika sōmata are composed of the homoeomers, the latter are composed of 
the four elements. Coutant (1971), xiii notes unequivocally: ‘all terrestrial bodies 
contain all four elements.’ More recently, Bolzan (1976), 139 and Freudenthal 
(1995), 11 appear to have taken all the homoeomers to be combinations of 
the four elements and so do Viano (2006), 122, 124 and Lewis. Lewis (1996), 
144, n. 244 reacts with surprise to the distinction between simple homoeomers 
and mixed ones mentioned by alexander (in his commentary of Meteor. iV.10): 
‘This distinction is confusing. it seems that a simple body is one composed of 
water (and so moist), while mixed bodies are composed of water and earth, 
and so thickened by cold. Yet, of course, all things are actually composed of all 
four elements.’ alexander, i should add, seems willing to persuade himself that 
each homoeomer consists of a combination of all four simple bodies, despite 
the fact that occasionally, as here, he cannot help virtually quoting aristotle 
who unambiguously and insistently marks a distinction between simple and 
compound homoeomers. 
 3 i take earth, water, air and fire to be simple in the sense that they cannot be 
analyzed into simpler bodies (see, e.g., De Caelo iii.3 302a16) and implicitly i agree 
with Gill’s view that, while the basic contraries are crucial to our understanding 
of elemental transformation (the persistent quality corresponds to matter in 
substantial transformation, while the quality being replaced and the replacement 
correspond to lack, sterēsis, and to form in a generic formula of change), they are 
not constitutive ingredients of the aforementioned bodies. as Gill (1989), 77 notes: 
‘This immunity from further division is the reason why aristotle claims that the 
elements are generated from one another. The elements must come to be from one 
another because, unlike all other generated things, there is nothing simpler from 
which they can be produced.’ For a detailed argument, see Gill (1989), especially 
ch. 2; for an alternative view on this subject, see, e.g., Lewis (1996), 15–22.  
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different behaviors among them and, so, from being divisible into distinct 
kinds or forms (eidē) according to their material dispositions.4 Meteor. iV 
may not be a fully polished treatise and, as a consequence, it tends to be 
less consistent than one wishes it were; however, even if aristotle was not 
fully committed to the idea that, in addition to compounds, there are also 
pure and simple stuffs – consisting of only one element – in the sublunary 
world, at the very least it is reasonably clear, as i hope to prove, that he did 
not completely reject this possibility. if my interpretation is correct, we 
may need to rethink and redefine aristotle’s concept of homoeomer, which 
involves uniformity, but not necessarily a composite nature (although, again, 
most of the homoeomers are indeed compounds). in short, i would like to 
reexamine both the notion that all uniform bodies are compounds (of earth 
and water or of all four simple bodies) and the cognate notion that elements 
cannot exist on their own, but are only present in potentiality as ingredients 
in chemical combinations. The last section of my paper will consider several 
implications of my reexamination for aristotle’s cosmology and theory of 
mixis and separation, as well as a few additional clarifications regarding the 
‘purity’ of the simple bodies and the emergence of both dispositional and 
categorical properties.
 4 For aristotle’s view of what we would call today dispositional properties, see 
especially his theoretical treatment of dunamis in Metaphysics Δ.12 and in Θ. 
Dispositions, i should add, are still very much at the heart of modern theories 
and debates in the philosophy of science, metaphysics and philosophy of mind. 
Recent studies on dispositions have offered divergent views on this notion; 
let me quote here two relatively uncontroversial definitions. The first one was 
proposed by Tim Crane (in Crane, 1996, 1–2) and seems to echo what aristotle 
himself wrote about powers or capacities: ‘…a disposition is a property (such 
as solubility, fragility, elasticity) whose instantiation entails that the thing which 
has the property would change, or bring about some change, under certain 
conditions. For instance, to say that some object is soluble is to say that it would 
dissolve if put in water… The fragility (solubility, elasticity) is a disposition; 
the breaking (dissolving, stretching) is the manifestation of the disposition… 
These characteristics of the world – fragility, poisonousness, flammability, 
nourishingness, loyalty, honesty, courage and humour – are all dispositions.’ 
and, in Goodman’s (1955), 40 suggestive formulation, we are urged to notice 
that ‘Besides the observable properties it exhibits and the actual processes it 
undergoes, a thing is full of threats and promises. The dispositions or capacities 
of a thing – its flexibility, its inflammability, its solubility – are no less important to 
us than its overt behaviour, but they strike us by comparison as rather ethereal.’
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Note oN the homoeomeRs  
ANd oN theIR PlACe IN METEoR. IV
Both the beginning and the end of Meteor. iV (chapters 1 and 12) stress 
the intermediary status of the homoeomers, between the simplest bodies 
(earth, water, air and fire) and the non-uniform bodies – ta anomoiomerē, 
such as complex organs or parts; a hand, for instance, is made of a number 
of homogeneous tissues, i.e. organic homoiomerē (see, e.g., Meteor. iV.10, 
388a18–19).5 This intermediary zone does not seem to have a very prominent 
position in aristotle’s metaphysics, yet it is at least indirectly pivotal to his 
metaphysics in so far as almost all substances are either uniform bodies or 
aggregates of uniform bodies; and, one should hurry to add, this intermediary 
domain is certainly crucial to his science and natural philosophy.
The transparent etymon of homoiomeres (‘like-parted’) is homoion 
meros (‘like / similar part’). The term is generally applied to materials that 
are uniform or homogeneous: a portion of the pulp of, say, an apple displays 
the same basic characteristics as any other portion of the pulp of that apple. 
Each part of a homoeomerous body is ‘synonymous’ with the whole. Uniform 
stuffs, such as wood and stone, marrow and iron, salt and blood, appear to be 
the respective results of various processes of generation, which hinge partly 
on the thoroughly uniform combination of ingredients like the four so-called 
elements (earth, water, air, fire) or of the two types of exhalation (dry and 
moist anathumiaseis). Different ratios between such elemental constituents 
and the thermic processes affecting them account largely for the enormous 
variety among uniform bodies with respect to their appearance and behavior. 
as we learn especially from GC i.10, the original ingredients (ta mikta) of 
such uniform compounds survive in the final products potentially, some 
of their original properties being still present in the resulting homoeomer, 
although the process of mixis or krasis – the thoroughly uniform mixing – also 
generates new, emergent properties in the resulting compound (the michthen 
 5 another line of demarcation between homoeomers and anomoeomers is 
generally the complexity of their respective functions. although the organic like-
parted bodies can be defined in virtue of their functions (for example, flesh as a 
medium for touch, blood as a conveyor of food to the other parts of an organism 
etc.), in addition to their material composition (see, e.g., GA ii.1 734b30–31 and 
much of its book V, and PA ii), the anomoeomers (such as a hand) are generally 
capable of fulfilling more complex functions and activities (erga and praxeis). 
implicitly, the simple or uniform parts are for the sake of the complex ones, of 
which they are constituent parts. See also PA ii.1 646b12 and Meteor. iV.12.
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or krathen). This is significantly different from earlier theories (of the pluralists 
among the Presocratics, and of Plato), where uniform materials are created by 
the rearrangement of elements, for instance, of minimal particles of some sort 
in Democritean atomism and in Plato’s brand of atomism in the Timaeus.
according to the aristotelian account, notably in GC i.10, we can divide 
a uniform body (e.g., a piece of bark or of fat) into ever smaller pieces without 
ever reaching or isolating the original constituents, since they are not actually 
present in the homoeomer,6 in contrast with a mechanical mixture (of, say, 
ground pepper and salt or, to take aristotle’s example, wheat and barley) in 
which the particles would preserve their defining nature. Furthermore, the 
small bits into which the homoeomer has been divided will display the same 
defining material properties as any other portion of that body and indeed as 
that whole uniform body. This kind of similarity between part and whole (as 
well as between parts within a whole) is obviously not applicable to complex 
parts, such as an eye or a face. The contrast between uniform and non-
uniform bodies is marked firmly in Meteor. iV, e.g., in ch. 10, at 388a13–20; as 
Meteor. iV is largely devoted to the nature and formation of the homoeomers, 
we would expect an explicit definition of those uniform bodies, but aristotle 
prefers to list examples rather than to offer a definition proper:7
By uniform bodies i mean, for instance, stuffs that are mined – such as 
copper, gold, silver, tin, iron, stone and other such stuffs and materials 
that have been separated out of them, as well as tissues that can be found 
 6 Perhaps the sole notable (possible) exception to this rule is the famous passage 
in Physics i.4 (187b14–21) that spawned the theory of minima naturalia in 
the Middle ages and inspired, at least indirectly, a plethora of chemical and 
quasi-chemical theories in early modern science. it is also worth adding that a 
rather rare dissenting view can be found in Cooper (2004), a note on aristotle’s 
concept of mixis in GC which attempts to refute the traditional (at least since 
Philoponus) thesis about ‘total interfusion’. Cooper’s interpretation allows for 
the possibility that extremely small amounts of stuff could consist of pure earth 
or pure water etc. in a mixture. 
 7 For similar lists of homoeomers in contexts where one would rather expect 
a formal definition, see PA ii.2 647b10 ff., part of a general introduction to a 
mini-treatise on uniform parts, comprising PA ii.4–9, and Historia Animalium 
i.1 487a2–9, part of a synopsis of types of differentiae (diaphorai) among species 
of animals, where aristotle is primarily concerned with the distinction between 
soft and moist uniform parts on the one hand (Peck translates hugra with ‘liquid’, 
rather than ‘moist’, but lard and marrow are not exactly liquid), and solid and 
dry on the other hand (sinew, skin, blood vessel, bone, horn etc.). 
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in animals and in plants; for example, kinds of flesh, kinds of bone, 
sinew, skin, gut, hair, fibre, veins, from which have been composed the 
complex parts: face, hand, foot and the like; and uniform stuffs that can 
be found in plants are wood, bark, leaf, root, and the like.8
There are two similar lists in ch. 8 (384b31–385a1) and in ch. 12 (390b3–10) 
of Meteor. iV. all three passages are accompanied by reminders of how these 
uniform stuffs come about (through the agency of the active factors, hot and 
cold, on the passive ones, dry and moist or earth and water, in keeping with 
the precepts put forth in ch. 1) and of how they can be differentiated (through 
their powers or affections – dunameis or pathē: hardness, ductility etc.).
it may be useful at this point to sketch the content and purpose of Meteor. 
iV, a treatise that was the object of an impressive number of commentaries 
from late antiquity through late Renaissance, although it tends to be less 
widely read today. homogeneous stuffs play a cardinal role in aristotle’s 
theory of matter, especially in his discussion of chemical combination, and 
are central to his explanatory apparatus in the biological corpus. Yet, it is 
in Meteor. iV that we find a detailed and systematic investigation into the 
nature and formation of both organic and inorganic uniform bodies. it is 
worth remembering that Meteor. iV is not a book about meteorology, even 
in an aristotelian sense.9 its position after Meteor. iii may be an accident 
related to the early tribulations of aristotle’s manuscripts. it has rightly been 
considered transitional from works that are primarily concerned with the 
study of inorganic materials (De Caelo iii–iV, GC,10 and to some extent Meteor. 
 8 Translations in this paper are mine unless otherwise indicated. 
 9 aristotelian meteorology covers phenomena occurring in the sublunary sphere 
due chiefly to the dry and the moist exhalations and including the appearance 
of the Milky Way, comets, meteors, earthquakes, and what we would consider 
today to be meteorological phenomena proper (all these topics form the 
substance of books i–iii).
 10 alexander (2–3 c. CE) suggested (179.3 ff.) that, as far as the subject matter 
goes, Meteor. iV would more naturally come after GC (for a discussion of his 
argument, see Natali (2002), 45–48. This suggestion becomes all the more 
appealing if we accept, with Joachim (1926), xxxvi–xvii, that in GC aristotle 
is concerned primarily with the genesis and phthora of the homoeomers, his 
discussion about the generation and destruction of the simple bodies being 
relevant to the former topic in so far as the simple bodies are the proximate 
constituents of the homoeomers. By contrast, Olympiodorus, agreeing roughly 
with ammonius (in Olympiodorus 6.19 ff.) argues (273.21–274.1) that book iV 
is placed rather naturally after Meteor. i–iii, since aristotle must have planned 
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i–iii) to aristotle’s biological works such as Parts of Animals and Generation 
of Animals. This idea has become common currency with the publication of 
Furley’s 1983 paper, although the point was possibly suggested by aristotle 
himself, in the first chapter of Meteor. i, a chapter that is both retrospective 
and programmatic.11 Besides, in the final chapter (ch. 12) of Meteor. iV, at 
389b23–2812 and 390b15–23, aristotle explicitly states that, after dividing 
homoeomers into kinds (genē) in the bulk of this book, his next task is to 
consider organic homoeomers individually (kath’hekaston); a crucial factor 
in determining their nature individually will be, in his biological corpus, the 
use of functional accounts, involving systematic appeal to final causes.
to deal with the nature and affections of the elements in the following order: 
the elements as entities not subject to generation (De caelo); the generation of 
the elements (GC); ways in which the elements can be affected (the Meteorology 
– presumably all four books, the fourth one simply expanding – in general 
fashion – on the discussion, at the end of book iii, about some of the inorganic 
homoeomers, i.e. metals and stones). For a commentary on Olympiodorus’ 
argument, see Viano (2002), 67–69. 
 11 in Meteor. i.1 (339a6 ff.) aristotle describes the overall trajectory of his research 
by saying that, after offering his explanations of meteorological phenomena, he 
will provide general and particular accounts of animals and plants. Both the 
‘general’ (katholou) and the ‘particular’ (chōris, kath’ hauto) approaches can be 
found in aristotle’s extant biological corpus and may have been present also in 
some lost treatises on botany, especially if Theophrastus’ own works roughly 
reflect the nature of their aristotelian models. Still, Meteor. iV too is overtly 
meant to offer a generic account of uniform bodies; its ‘particular’ counterpart 
can be found in PA and in GA, in so far as the organic uniform parts are 
concerned (and, we can conjecture, aristotle probably also intended to give a 
more detailed account of mineral uniform bodies, although, as Olympiodorus 
assures us at the outset of his commentary on Meteor. iV, aristotle never actually 
carried out that project).
 12 The beginning of Meteor. iV.12 (389b23–28) reads: ‘Since we have made 
distinctions regarding these issues, let us say what flesh or bone or any of the 
other homoeomers is separately; for we can see – by their generation – from 
what elements the nature of the homoeomers has been constituted, what their 
kinds are and to which kind each homoeomer pertains.’ This passage seems 
almost echoed by the end of PA ii.5: ‘We have stated, regarding blood, serum, 
and soft and hard fat, both what each of them is, and owing to what causes each 
of them is’ (trans. Lennox) and may be reminiscent of the end of Meteor. iii: ‘i 
have discussed then all these stuffs [i.e. metals and stones] in general, and now 
i should tackle and inquire into each kind individually.’ 
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Thus, chapter 12 gives prominence to one of the emblematic motifs 
of aristotle’s natural philosophy. The study of organisms and of individual 
parts should combine an inquiry into their material constitution (a task 
largely assumed by Meteor. iV at a generic level) with an account of the 
functions that essentially determine the nature of those parts (this being 
fulfilled by various segments of aristotle’s biological works). The views 
expressed in ch. 12 are instrumental in our correctly placing Meteor. iV 
within the aristotelian corpus (the ‘missing link’ between works dealing with 
the inorganic and works devoted essentially to biology), to fully grasping 
aristotle’s resort to conditional necessity and to our correctly assessing the 
role of the homoeomerous bodies within a biological context.
however, the actual, dominant achievement of Meteor. iV lies elsewhere: 
most of the fourth book (chs. 1–11) is devoted to the study and division 
of kinds of homoeomers (or homogeneous stuffs, uniform bodies) and of 
various effects of heat and cold on such uniform stuffs – an enterprise that 
will turn out to be profitable in the study of simple and complex ‘parts’ in 
treatises like PA, where aristotle does not have to embark on lengthy and 
detailed inquiries into the nature of uniform bodies every time he considers 
the material nature of some tissue, such as blood or flesh. instead, he can 
conveniently glimpse back, as it were, at his earlier investigation in Meteor. iV 
and, based on the perceptible properties of some tissue, he can presumably 
determine its composition: watery, mostly earthy etc.13 PA ii and GA V,14 to 
mention only the most obvious examples, contain numerous such details 
that appear to draw on Meteor. iV.
the offICIAl doCtRINe:  
All homoeomeRs ARe ComPouNds
i have emphasized some of the connections between the GC theory of mixis 
and the Meteor. iV discussion about ta homoiomerē not only in order to stress 
the complementariness – in key respects – of these two texts, but also to 
 13 This is in keeping with the ‘economical’ approach that – as Lennox (2001) has 
demonstrated – is displayed within the PA itself: aristotle starts, in PA ii, with an 
investigation into the nature of uniform parts, before engaging in a discussion 
of non-uniform parts in books iii, iV (had he done otherwise, he would have 
had to account for the nature of tissues when tackling each complex organ).
 14 however, Historia Animalium iii (largely devoted to the uniform parts of 
blooded animals) exhibits virtually no interest in the ‘chemical’ composition of 
the organic uniform stuffs. 
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introduce a passage from GC that is central to my argument. in this locus 
classicus, aristotle reveals the scope of his discussion about uniform stuffs 
and, implicitly, its relevance to his natural philosophy and his science. it turns 
out that not only are genuine chemical combinations thoroughly uniform, 
but these uniform stuffs, which encompass the whole realm of nature, 
contain (dunamei,15 of course) all four simple bodies – earth, water, air, and 
fire. We have to assume that this is the case, whether the actual uniform 
compounds in the sublunary world were the result of the blending of simple 
bodies or of other uniform compounds (e.g., bronze, an alloy of copper and 
tin) whose composition could in turn be analyzed ultimately into the four 
simple bodies. Ch. 7 of GC ii provides an account of how simple bodies can 
mix to form homogeneous compounds displaying emergent properties that 
are generated at various points along the hot-cold and moist-dry continua; 
the next segment, ch. 8, is meant to indicate how pervasive this phenomenon, 
mixis, is and to prefigure some of the points that will be developed in chs. 9 
and 10 (on the causes of coming to be and passing away). here is the opening 
passage of GC ii.8:
all the mixed bodies (ta mikta), the ones that are around the central 
region, are composed of all the simple bodies. For earth exists in all 
[compounds in the central region] because each [simple body, including 
earth] exists chiefly and in greatest supply in its proper place, while water 
[can be found in all compounds in the central region] because what is 
a compound (to suntheton) must be delimited, and among the simple 
bodies only water is easily delimitable, and, moreover, even earth could 
not hold together without the moist, which is what keeps it together; for, 
if the moist were completely removed from it, it would fall apart. Thus, it 
is for these reasons that earth and water exist in [bodies that are around 
the central region], whereas air and fire [can be found in them] because 
 15 a recent and careful comparison between the GC account of mixis and Meteor. 
iV is provided by Viano (2006). She rejects Joachim’s interpretation (1926), 
176, 180–181, which follows Philoponus and zabarella, namely that dunamis in 
this context should be understood as a sort of diminished second potentiality, 
similar to a drunk geometer’s diminished ability to solve a problem. instead, 
Viano (2006), 126 suggests that what aristotle must have had in mind were the 
sort of intrinsic dunameis listed and defined in chapters 8 and 9 of Meteor. iV: 
liquefiable, breakable, splittable, combustible etc. She adds that such qualities are 
due to some extent to the thermic processes which contributed to the mixing 
and to the formation of a new uniform body. This is certainly sensible but does 
not completely dispel the fog shrouding the use of dunamei here. 
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they are contraries of earth and water (for earth is the contrary of air 
and water of fire, in so far as a substance can be the contrary of another 
substance).16
aristotle’s formulations are typically elliptic and the passage is 
occasionally baffling (e.g., ta mikta and to suntheton appear to be used 
synonymously here despite the fact that the two terms correspond to 
concepts – mixis and sunthesis – that are markedly distinct in GC i.10 as 
they correspond to chemical combination and to aggregation or mechanical 
mixture respectively). Besides, it is not clear that everything in the sublunary 
region is composed of all four simple bodies, given that all of these claims 
appear to be qualified by the formula ‘around the central region’ (the contrast 
is obviously with what is closer to the orbit of the moon but still in the 
sublunary sphere, which raises potentially interesting questions about the 
two exhalations, as we shall see in the final section of this paper).
Still, the drift of the passage is clear enough and i think Williams (1982), 
51 is quite right in entitling his translation of ch. 8 ‘Each Element Present 
in Every homoeomer’. The first sentence of ch. 8 may seem somewhat 
ambiguous, since the sum total of the compound bodies (around the central 
body, i.e. earth) could consist of all four simple bodies, without this entailing 
necessarily that each uniform compound contains all four simple bodies in a 
certain proportion; this possible ambiguity, however, is dispelled by the next 
sentences. Different reasons are offered for the presence of (a) earth, (b) water 
and (c) air and fire in all the homoeomers situated in the proximity of the 
Earth. The ubiquitous presence of earth in the central region of the universe 
is due to its abundance in its natural place; water is necessary for the cohesion 
of all uniform bodies and their acquisition of definite shapes;17 air and fire 
too are present in all homoeomers, since, as we learn from the next few lines, 
comings about are due to contraries (hai geneseis ek tōn enantiōn eisin). What 
aristotle must have in mind here is that substances (ousiai), specifically 
the four simple bodies, are conceivable as contraries in so far as they are 
characterized by opposite pairs of basic qualities (dry and cold, i.e. earth vs 
moist and hot, i.e. air; moist and cold, i.e. water vs dry and hot, i.e. fire) and 
are theoretically reducible to four dominant properties: water to cold and fire 
 16 334b31–335a6.  
 17 Regarding the adaptability in shape of the moist, see GC ii.2 329b31, Meteor. iV.4 
381b28–30.
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to hot; air to moist and earth to dry.18 While the reasons for the presence of 
earth and water in all compounds sound reasonable within the bounds of 
aristotle’s cosmology, the one offered for the notion that air and fire too must 
be found dunamei in all compounds is less cogent. The illustration meant to 
bolster his point is that each compound is nourished by an array of things 
partly similar to its constitution (for instance, plants need both water and 
earth, 335b11–14; cf. GA iii.11 762b12), although it is notable that air and 
fire are not mentioned in this example. Judging by its larger context, this 
argument for the presence of fire and air in all compounds is chiefly but 
perhaps not exclusively an expedient intended to ensure a smooth transition 
to the distinction made in chs. 9 and 10 between the four types of causation. 
in light of chs. 9 and 10, aristotle’s ch. 8 glimpse at the compounds around the 
center of the universe acquires greater significance: it points out the effect of 
the principal efficient cause responsible for the phenomena in the sublunary 
world – the sun’s continuous movement along the ecliptic (ch. 10).
i will pass over the metaphysical significance of ch. 8, interesting though 
it might be (involving the preservation of the matter-form unity and the 
distinction between nourishment which is essentially matter and that which 
gets nourished, namely the shape or form taken together with matter), since my 
goal here is rather to bring attention to and to briefly analyze crucial passages 
where aristotle argues for the ‘official doctrine’ that all (uniform) compounds 
are chemical combinations. Let me now tackle another such passage, which 
shares much with the one that i have just examined. as i mentioned before, 
ta homoiomerē are not defined explicitly and technically in Meteor. iV, but the 
passage that comes closest to offering a definition is the following one:
… heat exists in all bodies because they are crafted by [heat and cold], 
and cold exists in some in so far as the heat is lacking. So, since these are 
present in virtue of their being active, moist and dry in virtue of their 
being passive, the mixed bodies (ta koina) partake of them all. Therefore, 
the homoeomers consist of both water and earth, in the case of plants 
and animals, and, as for stuffs that are mined, such as gold, silver and 
the like, they consist of [earth and water] as well as of the enclosed 
exhalation pertaining to each of the two [i.e. to earth and to water], as 
has been mentioned elsewhere (iV.8 384b26-385a1).19
 18 This conforms to GC ii.3 331a1–6, but may be slightly problematic for aristotle 
since it is ‘water’ and ‘the moist’ / ‘moisture’ (rather than ‘cold’) that are used 
interchangeably in this very passage and throughout Meteor. iV. 
 19 See Meteor. iii.6.
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These lines are intended to preface a division of (especially solid) 
homoeomers based on intrinsic or primary dispositional properties – 
breakable stuffs, flammable stuffs etc., as opposed to a possible division along 
the lines of colors and other essentially perceptible properties. The idea that 
all simple bodies are present in all homoeomers is slightly attenuated here, 
since aristotle notes that all four basic opposites (hot, cold, moist, dry)20 along 
with only two of the simple bodies, earth and water, and the exhalations 
(presumably in the case of stones and metals alone) are present in the 
homoeomers. Yet, even if he is not concerned here with air and fire as quasi-
universal ingredients,21 the discrepancy with the passage from GC ii.8 may 
only be apparent (after all, even in GC ii.8 only earth and water are explicitly 
named as ‘nourishment’ for plants). in any case, this possible discrepancy 
is not particularly troubling, given that aristotle’s ‘chemistry’ in Meteor. iV 
 20 Cf. PA 646a14 ff. For a helpful discussion about aristotle’s apparent hesitation 
between treating the homoeomers as compounds of simple bodies and 
regarding them as consisting of dry, moist and the other basic opposites, see 
Rashed (2005), cxxvi–cxxix and passim. 
 21 alexander (213.10–12) believes that aristotle must have meant that uniform 
compound bodies are combinations of all four simple bodies and that aristotle 
may have mentioned only earth and water here because they tend to predominate 
in homoeomers. This is less than obvious, though, from the text and its context. 
There are also other passages that suggest that air and fire are only scantily 
present in most homoeomers, if at all (thus at 382a7 ff. aristotle points out that 
animals live only on land and in water, which are also the stuffs from which 
organisms are constituted, but not in air or fire, which seems to imply that air and 
fire are largely absent, with some exceptions, from their material constitution; 
by the way, in GC ii 7, 334b5 aristotle does speak, albeit tentatively, about fire 
and earth as the ingredients of flesh, but he apparently takes his own example 
cum grano salis). Frede (2004), 311 suggests that ‘The special importance that is 
attributed to two of the simple bodies, namely earth and water [i.e. in Meteor. 
iV] clearly comes from the need to keep simple the basic principles that underlie 
the wide variety of phenomena.’ That aristotle simplifies his chemical formulas, 
so to speak, for the sake of clarity and simplicity would be a more convincing 
suggestion if he referred exclusively to earth and water in Meteor. iV; yet when 
a reference to air is required by the explanation of the behavior of certain stuffs 
(oil, wood etc.), he mentions it without hesitation. his overall division into 
kinds of stuffs would likely not become very complicated if he were to also 
invoke air as an elemental constituent more systematically. i submit that the 
main (not necessarily the only) reason why he does not do so is because such 
homoeomers form a relatively small set – in so far as he ventures to determine 
the airy nature of certain uniform materials.
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and in his biological corpus relies heavily on the ratio between earth and 
water or dry and moist in the uniform stuffs, whereas air and fire play a 
much more discreet role there. More importantly, both passages contend 
that the four basic opposites (not just the simple bodies resulting from their 
pairings) must be present in all homoeomers. Finally, the exhalations (not 
mentioned in GC, but pivotal in Meteor. i–iii and looming in the background 
of Meteor. iV) are probably nothing but the simple bodies at various stages in 
their process of transformation (more on this, later in this paper), one of the 
exhalations being smoky or fiery, the other one being moist.
The inferential oun, ‘therefore’, after ‘the homoeomerous bodies’ implies 
not only that all compound bodies include (dunamei) moist and dry or water 
and earth, but also that (all the)22 homoeomerous bodies are compounds. if so, 
he means that each and every type of homoeomer includes all four opposites, 
rather than that one can find all four opposites in the sum total of homoeomers, 
without it being necessary that all four opposites be present in each and every 
type of homoeomer (although note that cold – as an active factor, not as mere 
privation – is present in some, tisi, maybe not all, uniform bodies).
This seems largely to square with GC ii.8 as well as with the passage 
in ch. 4 of Meteor. iV (381b24–382a4) where aristotle reminds us that the 
passive principles of physical bodies are the moist and the dry (hugron kai 
xēron) and that ‘the other things’ are combinations of dry and moist. he 
curiously enlists Empedocles in his service, quoting from his poem on 
Nature (‘gluing the barley meal with water’, 382a1) a passage which conveys 
the idea that water is necessary for ensuring cohesion and for preventing 
solids from disintegrating.23 his next comment seems to qualify his initial, 
apparently universal, claim (covering all homoeomers, solid and liquid), by 
saying that ‘definite bodies’ (hōrismena sōmata), which presumably refers only 
to solids,24 include both water and earth in their composition. Even so, this 
passage, along with the ones i quoted from GC ii.8 and Meteor. iV.8, argues 
quite firmly for the view that all the homoeomers are compounds and that at 
the very least they include earth and water (dunamei) if not all four simple 
bodies – and thus all four basic opposites.
 22 Cf. below, ek men oun hudatos kai gēs ta homoiomerē sōmata sunistatai… Like 
koina above, homoiomerē has the definite article ta, which possibly adds the 
strength of a generic or even universal claim.
 23 This reinforces the thesis proposed in GC i.10 as well as Meteor. iV.8. 
 24 See on this Düring (1944), 78. 
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as i have already mentioned, this is also the orthodox view generally 
embraced by commentators when tackling the nature of the homoeomers. 
The problem is that aristotle himself is far less consistent in this respect than 
he may seem to be and the fluidity of dominant aspects of his conception 
of uniform stuffs – a work in progress, one might say – will hopefully be 
apparent from the following list of passages.
NotABle eXCePtIoNs
There is strong evidence in Meteor. iV that aristotle was not fully committed 
to his own theory that all homoeomerous bodies are composed of the four 
simple bodies or at least of both earth and water, after all. it turns out that 
some uniform stuffs consist of only one element, specifically only of earth or 
only of water. here is a list of examples from Meteor. iV (in the order in 
which they appear there) which, i believe, call into question the tempting but 
perhaps false view that aristotle consistently considered all uniform bodies 
to be compounds and, furthermore, considered them to be combinations of 
all four simple bodies or at least of earth and water in various proportions.
1. Absence of water / moist (pure earth?)
Ch. 3 of Meteor. iV includes a discussion of boiling (hepsēsis), 380b13–
381a12, which is a type of concoction (pepsis) that affects the properties of 
homoeomers through the moist heat of the undetermined stuff present in 
the moisture of a homoeomer. in this context, we find that there are uniform 
bodies that cannot be boiled because they contain no moisture at all (a rather 
emphatic formula: en hōi mēden estin hugron, 380b25), for instance certain 
stones, or contain moisture but are too dense to be boiled, for instance wood. 
Therefore, certain kinds of stones appear to be completely devoid of water 
and probably to consist only of earth, although this does not seem to prevent 
them from maintaining their cohesion, which contradicts some of the claims 
made in GC ii.8 and in Meteor. iV.4.
in ch. 6 aristotle deals, among other things, with solidification as a result 
of the complete evaporation of water from a compound, a process that is 
responsible, for example, for the production of baked clay (383a20–21, cf. 
383b11): ‘Therefore, things that are soft but are not moist do not thicken but 
solidify, as the moist leaves them, for instance baked clay (optōmenos keramos).’ 
There is no qualification implied in this process of evaporation, which likely 
suggests that what is left – namely, baked clay – lacks moisture altogether and 
perhaps is ‘pure’ earth, paradoxically displaying, besides cohesion, a specific 
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set of secondary dispositional differentiae. This reading is supported by the 
end of ch. 7 (384b20–22) where aristotle affirms that baked clay consists of 
earth only (gēs monon).
in ch. 8, in a succinct discussion of solidification, aristotle notes (385a28–
31) that ‘Some stuffs are dissolved by the moist because the moist is absent 
[from their constitution] (hugrou apousiāi), unless they have contracted such 
that their pores have been left too small for the particles of water [to penetrate 
them], which is the case, for example, with [baked] clay; yet, if this is not so 
[i.e., if their pores do not prevent water from entering], they are all dissolved 
by the moist, for instance, soda, salt and mud reduced to earth.’  a few lines 
further (385b1–3), he speaks again of uniform stuffs that are devoid of watery 
moisture: ‘incapable of solidification are those stuffs that do not have watery 
moisture (hosa mē echei hugrotēta hudatōdē) and do not consist of water (mēde 
hudatos estin) but consist more of the hot and of earth, for example honey 
and must (for they are in the process of boiling, as it were)…’
at the beginning of ch. 9, in a passage (385b6–12) dealing with things 
that are softenable by heat (ta malakta) we learn that this material disposition 
is present in uniform bodies that contain predominantly earth, but not 
only earth as it is the case with soda and salt, from which all moisture has 
evaporated (exikmastai pan) and thus end up containing only earth;25 also, 
if a body is to be softenable by heat, its moisture must not be present in 
disproportionately small quantity, like in potter’s clay (to be understood: 
unbaked clay), keramos. Significant here is the sharp distinction between 
earthy bodies that include a very small amount of moisture and those that 
truly lack any moisture whatsoever, which, given the absence of references to 
fire and air, indicates the possibility that some bodies are made just of earth.
in ch. 10, at 388b12–24, aristotle distinguishes solids that contain only 
earth both from solids that contain only water (e.g., ice) and from solids 
which are predominantly earthy but from which moisture has not evaporated 
completely. here is the passage on what appear to be purely earthy solids:
…Those stuffs [that are solidified] by heat, consist of earth, for instance 
clay, cheese, soda, salt; those which are solidified by both [heat and cold] 
consist of both [earth and water] (such are the stuffs solidified by cooling, 
as a result of the lack of both heat and moist; for salt and [the other] stuffs 
 25 Cf. ch. 9 in book Vii of Problems (whose authorship is a notoriously thorny issue, 
although it generally includes reflections on genuinely Peripatetic theories), 
where salt, dust and niter are suggested to lack moisture. 
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that are made purely of earth (hosa eilikrinē gēs)26 solidify solely due to the 
lack of the moist, while ice solidifies only due to the lack of heat). For this 
reason they are solidified by both [heat and cold] and contain both [earth 
and water]. Those stuffs from which [the moist] has been evaporated 
entirely (hapan exikmasthē), such as [baked] clay and amber – all of them 
consist of earth (for amber as well as the stuffs called ‘tears’ exist due 
to a process of cooling, e.g., myrrh, frankincense and gum; amber too 
seems to belong to this kind and is the result of solidification as indeed 
demonstrated by the animals trapped in it; the hot, forced to leave by the 
[cold water of] the river evaporates the moisture, as it happens with the 
natural heat of boiled honey, when dropped into water).
Just as water or moisture seems to be completely absent from certain 
homoeomers, judging by a number of generally unequivocal comments in 
Meteor. iV, earth is absent from others, as we can see from the following list.
 26 instances of such genitive can also be found in PA, e.g., at 650b18 and 651a8. This 
rather curious genitive accompanied by einai or implying an einai occasionally 
suggests a predominant (rather than exclusive) ingredient; for example, wood 
consists of earth and air (ch. 7, 384b15–16: ta de xula estin gēs kai aeros), although 
not exclusively, since we know – and aristotle makes this point in no uncertain 
terms – that wood is also composed of water or the moist. On other occasions, 
however, this type of genitive seems to simply indicate an exclusive rather than 
just a predominant ingredient; e.g., at 10, 389a1–2: stuffs dissolved by water 
consist of earth (tauta de gēs), whereas stuffs that are not dissolved or melted by 
either water or fire consist of earth or of both (tauta ē gēs ē amphoin); in this case, 
logic would dictate that gēs, as opposed to amphoin, means ‘only of earth’, unless 
by amphoin aristotle does not mean just ‘water and earth’ but ‘water and earth in 
a rather balanced ratio’, which would leave open the possibility that gēs is roughly 
the semantic equivalent of ‘mainly of earth, in a composition in which water is 
in disproportionately low amount’. Such an interpretation, however, while not 
entirely impossible, does not appear to be warranted by the text of Meteor. iV. 
That this type of genitive + einai (or implying einai) is unlikely to always mean 
‘predominantly of (earth / water)’ is also suggested by aristotle’s addition of pleon 
or mallon to the genitive (which would be superfluous if the genitive itself would 
already imply predominance in such contexts): 383b20, 384a12, 385b3 etc. On the 
other hand, this type of genitive clearly does not always indicate an exclusive 
ingredient either, since sometimes aristotle feels compelled to add haplōs or 
monon for the sake of clarity (e.g., PA ii.2 649a31 ff). 
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2. Absence of earth / dry (pure water?)
according to ch. 3, 380a34 both dry and moist are necessary for the process 
of concoction (marked in part by thickening of the organic uniform body 
undergoing that change), concoction being one of the most pervasive organic 
processes in nature, according to the Stagirite. a similar point is made again 
in ch. 6 (383a11–13): ‘For this reason, such stuffs [i.e. those consisting of 
water] do not thicken when they are solidified, for thickening occurs when 
the moist departs and the dry becomes more compact; water (hudōr) alone 
among liquids does not thicken.’ Lee, who translates hudōr with ‘watery 
liquids’ is probably right to assume that hudōr is not just ‘water’ here; in any 
case, water and watery liquids, while not identical, are close enough to display 
very similar dispositional qualities (see, for instance, ch. 5 of Meteor. iV). 
implied here is the possibility that certain liquids lack earth (or dry). This 
passage in ch. 6 comes in the context of a survey of conditions that cause 
the liquefaction and solidification of the stuffs consisting of water (hosa 
hudatos, 383a7), as well as of combinations of earth and water (hosa de koina 
gēs kai hudatos, 383a14). Since these two types of uniform stuffs are clearly 
distinguished here, the first one (see especially 383a7–13) can be taken to 
refer to liquid uniform stuffs that are not compounds consisting of earth and 
water and probably contain water alone (maybe at slightly different points 
along the continua between the basic opposites, which might explain the 
distinction between water and various forms of water or watery liquids).
Ch. 10, much like ch. 6, appears to convey the notion that there are liquids 
(apparently distinguishable from each other) that are made entirely of water 
(388a30 ff.), their general and chief mark being a dispositional differentia: 
they tend to evaporate easily (stuffs that are less liable to evaporate consist 
of earth or of a combination of earth and water, like milk; or of earth and 
air, like honey;27 or water and air, like oil). a few lines further into the same 
ch. 10 (388b9 ff.), we read that stuffs, such as oil and sweet wine, which are 
thickened both by heat and by cold consist of several constituents or simple 
bodies (koina pleionōn). By implication, this passage allows for the existence 
of bodies made of only one element, including those that consist only of 
water. This impression is strengthened by the conclusion at 389a3–6:
if, then, all stuffs are either liquid or solid (and the stuffs characterized by 
the qualities just discussed are among these [i.e. liquids and solids]) and 
there is nothing in between, then all the properties have been discussed 
 27 if we are to accept Vimercati’s reading; see Lee (1952), 360, note b.  
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through which we can determine whether a stuff consists of earth or of 
water or is a compound consisting of several [simple bodies] (ē pleionōn 
koinon), and whether it has been constituted by fire or by cold or by both.
Finally, let me mention a passage in ch. 11 (at 389a29–b7) which reminds 
us that cold is not simply a privation (of warmth), but in a way it is also 
matter; among other things, he notes here that cold is a common and 
defining characteristic of earth and water and, consequently, bodies which 
consist of either element alone (hekaterou haplōs tou stoicheiou) – earth and 
water, which best exemplify the dry and the moist – are rather cold. as for 
compounds (hosa de koina), they tend to be warm. all this seems to indicate 
that some homoeomers consist of only one element, for example, just of 
earth or just of water.
This is not an exhaustive list of such examples, but i hope that it is 
sufficient to show that aristotle’s theory regarding the nature of homoeomers 
is more tentative than generally assumed and may occasionally entail serious 
cases of inconsistency within his treatment of matter.28 One is left with 
the strong impression that aristotle’s theory of matter was still a work in 
progress when he was writing Meteor. iV – certainly more so than modern 
commentaries tend to state or imply. Perhaps this should not come as an 
utter surprise, since, among other things, his Meteor. iV is not obviously or 
thoroughly coherent,29 and its extant form seems to be the result of successive 
revisions by the Stagirite.
in the passages that i have listed and briefly analyzed here he makes 
several general claims, which are complementary and sometimes coextensive: 
 28 The impression of inconsistency cannot be dispelled by questioning the 
authorship of Meteor. iV. Lee (1952), Furley (1989), Lewis (1996) and others 
have put any doubts about the authorship of this book to rest convincingly 
and, i think, definitively. it would also be implausible to take those passages to 
be interpolations in an otherwise aristotelian text, since they are central to the 
explanation of so many specific phenomena discussed in Meteor. iV and of the 
division of the homoeomers according to their chemical constitution, physical 
microstructure and to their dispositions.
 29 To mention just a few puzzles related to the structure and content of Meteor. 
iV: how are chapters 2 and 3 (dealing with concoction and inconcoction, pepsis 
and apepsia) to be connected with the subsequent chapters of this book? Why 
did he devote two sections (chs. 5–7 and ch. 10) to the ratio between earth and 
water in various homoeomers? how is the sole mention of the exhalations in 
Meteor. iV (384b33) to be reconciled with the rest of the explanatory apparatus 
(relying on references to water and earth or moist and dry)? 
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a) earth or water could be absent from the composition of certain uniform 
stuffs; b) some homoeomers consist of only one simple body, while others 
are compounds; c) more specifically, there are homogeneous stuffs that 
consist only of earth or only of water. Meteor. iV, as we have seen, seems to 
indicate that pure stuffs can only be found among inorganic homoeomers; 
the organic ones seem to always be compounds, involving a higher degree 
of chemical complexity and the presence of internal heat, emphuton thermon. 
Some of these passages are more explicit than others, but, considered both 
individually and as a collection, they point rather emphatically to the 
possibility that not all homoeomers are compounds (and that at least some of 
the uniform compounds do not consist of all four simple bodies, but maybe 
just of earth and water). Thus, quite a few passages in Meteor. iV signal a 
distinction between two sorts of uniform bodies – uniform compounds 
and simple or pure stuffs (actually consisting only of water or only of 
earth, in contrast with the potential presence of simple bodies in chemical 
combinations).30 This entails that a universal definition of the homoeomers 
should not include a reference to composite nature (although it is clear from 
the examples discussed by aristotle in Meteor. iV, PA ii, GA V etc. that most 
homoeomers are indeed compounds). Furthermore, this is not simply an 
isolated and whimsical point, subsequently disavowed in aristotle’s works; 
quite to the contrary, in the biological works, in passages clearly echoing 
Meteor. iV,31 he still seems to maintain that some uniform stuffs consist of 
only one simple body.
 30 Remarkably, this distinction seems to correspond, on a higher level of 
complexity, to the differentiation that aristotle makes explicitly between types 
of anomoeomers or non-uniform parts (PA ii.1 646b30–32): ‘…The non-uniform 
parts are capable of having been composed from the uniform parts, both from 
many of them and from one, as with some of the viscera; they are complex in 
configuration, though generally speaking they are composed of one uniform 
body (polumorpha gar tois schēmasin ex homoiomerous onta sōmatos hōs eipein 
haplōs)’ (trans. Lennox). 
 31 See, e.g., PA ii.2 649a31–33, hosa hudatos monon…hosa de gēs, ‘the stuffs made 
only of water…the stuffs made [by implication: only] of earth’; the significance of 
this qualification (monon) is further emphasized by another and quite different 
qualifier (mallon in hosa gēs mallon, the stuffs consisting mainly of earth). Now, 
it is empirically evident that even compounds in which water predominates, 
but is not exclusively present, will be solidified by cold, but aristotle does not 
appear to have thought of compounds when he used monon. What is also 
noteworthy in this passage is that it undoubtedly reflects Meteor. iV and the 
law-like statements one can find there (in this case: stuffs composed solely of 
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if i am right that earth and water can exist separately anywhere in the 
sublunary sphere, whether diffusely and amorphously or as lumps or, more 
intriguingly, as artifacts (albeit probably not as tissues or parts of animals), 
then a number of additional questions pertaining to the nature and formation 
of the homoeomers need to be answered – and that is the task that i will 
assume in the next and final section of this paper.
RelAted PRoBlems ANd teNtAtIVe solutIoNs
So far i have attempted to prove that aristotle’s claim regarding the 
combination of the four (sublunary) simple bodies is often decidedly more 
relaxed than many of his modern commentators seem to assume. it should be 
clear by now, i hope, that not all homoeomerous bodies include all four simple 
bodies dunamei (in various ratios); moreover, their nature does not appear 
to even reflect aristotle’s more qualified statement in Meteor. iV.8, where he 
explicitly posits the necessary presence of water and earth in all uniform 
stuffs (along with the exhalations, in some of them). in short, aristotle does 
not appear to have settled on a definitive theory in this respect, leaving wide 
open the possibility that uniform stuffs could consist of combinations of 
only some of the four simple bodies or, in some cases, could indeed consist 
of only one such body. assuming that this is correct, i would like now to 
consider three adjacent issues: how are homoeomers consisting, e.g., only of 
earth (amber, myrrh, salt etc.) generated? What is a pure stuff, given rather 
puzzling categories of uniform stuffs, such as the exhalations and forms of 
earth or water, and a possible distinction between ‘theoretical elements’ and 
‘practical elements’?32 how can one account for different behaviors among 
uniform bodies consisting of the same one element (e.g., earth)?
water are solidified by cold, whereas stuffs consisting – presumably only – of 
earth are solidified by heat or by fire). This supports my view that aristotle’s 
frequent references to pure earth and pure water do not form an aspect that 
pertains idiosyncratically to his theory of matter in Meteor iV and was duly 
abandoned after Meteor. iV had been written, but a feature that is profitably 
utilized in later writings, such as PA. he points out in this very passage that he 
previously discussed such dispositional differentiae more clearly elsewhere – en 
heterois – and, again, this is a fairly clear reference to Meteor. iV, as Peck (1937), 
128, note a: ‘See Meteor. 382b31 ff., 388b10 ff.’ and Lennox (2001), 195: ‘Cf. Meteor. 
iV.6 383a26–b17, and 7 384b2–23’, plausibly point out. 
 32 The terminology of a distinction of ‘theoretical elements’ and ‘practical elements’ 
is from Bolzan (1986), 135. 
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I. If homoeomers consisting of only one  
simple body are possible, how are they generated?
Some of the homogeneous stuffs that, according to aristotle, consist only of water 
or only of earth clearly start out as compounds of earth and water. an example 
is keramos or (unbaked) potter’s clay, which loses its moisture entirely as a result 
of a drastic process of separation of water from that combination, when clay is 
exposed to intense heat in the kiln and the external heat drives off the internal 
heat along with the moisture (more specifically, the moisture is thoroughly 
eliminated from clay, through a peculiar kind of transpiration, followed by 
evaporation proper). in the case of natural stuffs like salt, it is likely that natural 
evaporation (e.g., of moisture from brine) led to the formation of homoeomers 
consisting entirely of earth. aristotle tells us explicitly that evaporation (due to 
the expulsion of internal heat and moisture by cold) accounts for the formation 
of amber, myrrh, frankincense and gum, which presumably contain no water. 
Mixis remains important in this context, but it is the process of separation that 
ultimately leads (under specific thermic conditions) to the eventual formation of 
a uniform stuff consisting of only one element.
as i have mentioned, aristotle’s treatment of uniform bodies or ta 
homoiomerē relies heavily on the theory of mixis outlined in GC i.10, where 
aristotle points out (328a11–12) that genuine composition must be uniform 
(to michthen homoiomeres einai). he goes on to say that, just as a part of water 
is water, any part of a uniform compound should be a uniform compound 
(i.e. of the same kind as the whole). if such a homogeneous blend – for 
instance between liquids like water and wine – is to be possible, a number 
of conditions have to obtain: among other things, ‘When there is a certain 
equilibrium among their potencies (tais dunamesin), each one changes 
from its own nature to the one that dominates, and does not become the 
other, but rather becomes something in between and common [to both of 
them]’ (328a29–31). Finally, the stuffs to be mixed must display contrariety 
(enantiōsin echei, GC i.10 328a32, cf. GC i.7–9), since they should be able to act 
on each other. GC ii.2, 7 and Meteor. iV will flesh out these conditions, which 
are only sketched in GC i.10, and will deal in expectedly qualitative fashion 
(or, one might say, in vaguely quantitative fashion, by appealing to the more 
and the less) with the correlation between the ratio among the constituents 
and the defining properties of the resulting uniform combination.
Still, the question remains: why does thorough mixing not involve 
passing away?
Part of the answer lies obviously in the mutual alteration of the 
corresponding qualities belonging to the mixable bodies; as a result of this 
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peculiar type of alteration (in which each ingredient plays the dual role of 
agent and patient), the constituents are unified into a compound which 
displays a certain balance between the respective original qualities of those 
constituents (rather than those qualities being utterly eliminated or replaced 
etc.). This, however, may not be a complete answer. another part of the answer 
can be detected in aristotle’s wording and in the structure of that important 
passage in GC i.10. after contending, at 327b23 ff., that the ingredients persist 
dunamei33 in the new compound and have not perished (ouk apolōlota), he 
reminds us that this is a difficulty he faced earlier (viz. how is mixing possible 
if the ingredients disappear etc.) and points out that the original constituents 
existed separately before being combined thoroughly into a uniform body 
and can be separated again (dunamena chōrizesthai palin). in other words, 
mixis is a reversible process. Finally, he slightly reformulates his first point 
by saying that the original bodies and their qualities are not destroyed (oute 
phtheirontai), but rather their capacity is preserved (sōzetai gar hē dunamis 
autōn). Given the emphatic reference to separation, which connects the 
two formulations of this central point about mixis, and perhaps, to a lesser 
extent, the use of dunamena between the two occurrences of dunamis, 
aristotle seems to suggest that what prevents mixis from being a form of 
phthora is that the original ingredients can in principle be recovered (and 
thus their dunameis can be fully restored). The constitutive ingredients of a 
uniform compound can be themselves compounds (tin and copper could be 
separated from bronze), but if (some of) the ingredients are simple bodies, 
then a compound homoeomer could, through some form of separation, 
be reduced to pure earth and pure water. all textual indications are that 
aristotle meant such a process, and that his talk about separation was not to 
be taken merely abstractly or theoretically (as, for instance, one could only 
theoretically analyze, say, earth into dry and cold).34
 33 The use of dunamei in the GC i.10 treatment of mixis is curiously echoed by 
Meteor. ii.9 369a13–15 in a discussion about exhalations, which are always 
mixed together in various ratios.
 34 alexander explains this type of separation as a reverse process of alteration, 
involving specific effects of the active factors – heat or cold – among other 
things, and even offers some rather interesting experimental proof (De mixtione, 
231.30–232.12). as he puts it (in Todd’s translation, 1976, 157): ‘…[S]o must it 
be understood that agents which separate constituents from which blends have 
been formed also do not separate what is actually inherent in [blends] but cause 
an alteration by a specific force [dunamei tini], and actualise bodies that as a 
result of blending are present in them in potentiality.’
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Elements can, then, exist in pure form, for instance as a result of such – 
natural or artificial – separation. Still, maybe a qualification becomes necessary 
here: pure earth (in its various forms or eidē), while not a compound, is not 
to be confused, on the other hand, with a certain paradigmatic notion of 
earth that may indeed be purely theoretical. if it is such ‘theoretical elements’ 
(rather than their empirical manifestations) that aristotle had in mind when 
proclaiming that simple bodies cannot exist on their own, then there may still 
appear to be a way of reconciling those statements (in GC ii.8 and Meteor. iV. 
4 and 8) with the plethora of passages in Meteor. iV where the Stagirite insists 
on the complete absence of earth or water from certain homoeomers and on 
their purity. however, trying to do away with any contradiction between the 
two sets of passages because presumably the first one centers exclusively on 
‘theoretical elements’ and the second series is concerned only with ‘practical 
elements’ seems to me an implausible solution, since it is far from clear that 
in GC ii.8 and Meteor. iV.4 and 8, in passages that i discussed in connection 
with the ‘official doctrine’, aristotle actually referred strictly to that purely 
theoretical notion of elements. Therefore, the inconsistency that i pointed 
out in aristotle’s discussion of pure elements and their separate existence 
still stands and is likely due to his revision of his own theory and to the 
fact that, as far as Meteor. iV is concerned, it was never polished to a degree 
that would render it a robustly unified and thoroughly consistent treatise. 
While i cannot detect any explicit or implicit proof in the Greek text that 
such a distinction is made in the passages i discussed in connection with the 
‘official doctrine’, that distinction is indeed made elsewhere in both GC and 
the Meteorology and it raises potentially interesting questions related to my 
discussion about pure stuffs.
II. What does it mean for a simple body to be truly pure?  
What are the forms of earth and water  
and what are the exhalations?
i believe that a comparison between presumably pure stuffs (forms of earth 
and of water) and the exhalations (in the atmosphere, underground and in 
materials that have been mined) is a profitable angle from which we can 
tackle these questions. Elemental transformations are not sudden but gradual, 
given the continua between the four fundamental opposites.35 it is possible, 
 35 For a discussion about these continua and the notion of meson as put to work 
in the context of the formation of the homoeomers, see Bolzan (1986), 142. 
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therefore, that this could explain why there are different forms of, say, earth, 
depending on where they are situated along the continua between cold/dry 
and cold/moist. it is potentially significant that aristotle uses expressions 
like ‘forms (or kinds) of water’ and ‘forms (or kinds) of earth’36 which seem 
to echo similar formulations (if not the treatments of this notion) in the 
Timaeus37 and in several hippocratic writings,38 and which seem to indicate 
that, paradoxically, different stuffs can be made of the same (one) element. 
That is to say, salt, baked clay, amber etc. are eidē gēs in the sense that they are 
all placed closer to the ‘cold’ and ‘dry’ extremes than to the ‘hot’ and ‘moist’ 
extremes, but at somewhat different points along those continua than where 
aristotle would place truly simple and pure earth. it is also tempting to 
think that such stuffs are closer along those continua to ‘genuine’ (or, rather: 
‘theoretical’) earth than the dry exhalation is, and the same goes for forms of 
water and the moist exhalation, since aristotle never refers to the exhalations 
as forms of earth, water etc.
The structure of the sublunary world is represented occasionally in 
aristotle and frequently in his commentators as a succession of four contiguous 
strata, corresponding to the natural places of the so-called elements: earth in 
the middle, surrounded by water, which in turn is surrounded by a layer of 
air, the outermost layer being fire, which borders on the innermost celestial 
sphere and thus on aithēr. Given the continuous movement of the heavenly 
spheres and bodies (especially of the sun along the ecliptic circle) and their 
effect on the sublunary realm,39 this model is obviously meant to radically 
simplify a much more dynamic and wondrously messy structure. Large 
portions of land rise above waters and the soil contains vast amounts of fire; 
besides, the simple bodies go through various processes of generation and 
destruction (most commonly and noticeably in the course of evaporation of 
 36 See 388a25–26: gēs eidē kai… hudatos; 382b11, 13: hudatos eidē; 383b13–14: 
hudatos eidē. 
 37 in the Timaeus the genē and eidē of earth etc. are differentiated according to the 
variety of the elemental triangles (with respect to their sizes, presumably, not 
their types) and the blending with other so-called elements in small quantities: 
58c5, 58d3, 58d6, 60d, 82a. 
 38 E.g., in on Regimen: kinds or genē of earth, fire etc. are mentioned at iX.3; at X.1 
we read about dry and moist water (these examples may refer to compounds, 
though); at X.3, about the hottest and strongest fire; at XXXii.1, about the 
lightest water and the most elusive fire; XXXii.2 – the strongest fire, the densest 
water; XXXii.3 – the thickest water, the lightest fire etc. 
 39 On this, see, for example, Meteor. i.3 340b11–14.
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water into air and condensation of air or atmis into water, GC ii.4) that make 
this model appear all too schematic. The most volatile strata are, expectedly, 
air and fire, and they are indeed responsible, in aristotle’s meteorology, for 
a large number of phenomena, ranging from shooting stars and meteors to 
winds, rain and earthquakes. This picture is further complicated in the first 
three books of the Meteorology, where aristotle cautions us that ‘fire’ and 
‘air’ make for a convenient but potentially misleading nomenclature when 
applied to the stratification of the atmosphere. it turns out that ‘fire’ and ‘air’ 
are the causally unifying principle40 of virtually all meteorological processes 
in so far as they are not exactly fire and air, but exhalations that come from 
the earth when it is exposed to the sun’s rays.
i have mentioned before that there are two types of exhalations or 
anathumiaseis, which form the subject of a detailed study in Meteor. i–iii. 
(1) There is a relatively cold and moist one, often referred to as atmis, which 
comes about when the water on and in the soil is sufficiently warmed up and 
which occupies roughly the lower half of the atmosphere or what we take 
to be air41 (aristotle subdivides it into several substrata, depending on the 
content of humidity and on temperature). (2) The other type of exhalation 
is brought about when the sun warms up the earth; it is smoky (kapnōdēs)42 
and windy (pneumatōdēs), hot and dry, eminently combustible, and occupies 
the upper (or outer) portion of the atmosphere. When these exhalations are 
enclosed in the earth, the moist one is crucial in the production of metal 
ore, whereas the dry one is necessary, as efficient and material cause, in the 
formation of stones. The latter type is sometimes called simply ‘exhalation’, 
anathumiasis (a term otherwise covering both exhalations) or ‘smoke’, kapnos 
(a word normally designating only one of the various aspects of this type of 
dry exhalation).43 We are told repeatedly44 that the two exhalations do not 
 40 Regarding his insistence on this unifying principle, see Meteor. ii.9 370a26–33, 
iii.2 371b18–20 and iii.3 372b12–15 (ho autos epi pantōn harmosei logos). 
 41 in GC ii, at 2, 330b5 aristotle notes that air, being hot and moist, is like vapor 
(or: a sort of vapor, hoion atmis gar ho aēr). 
 42 Echoes of this theory are possibly detectable not just in Meteor. iV, but also in 
PA ii; thus at 649a22–23, where he submits the hypothesis that the substratum 
of fire is smoke and charcoal, charcoal becoming cold once the flame has been 
extinguished, whereas smoke is always hot, ‘for smoke is an exhalation.’ 
 43 Smoke consists of air and earth (GC ii.4 331b24), which are presumably present 
potentially in the composition of the dry exhalation. 
 44 Meteor. ii.3 358a21–22, ii.4 359b32–34, ii.9 369a13–15; they are distinguished 
according to whether they are predominantly, rather than purely, moist or dry. 
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exist in pure state, a situation strikingly analogous to the simple bodies (see 
GC i.10 and Meteor. iV.4 and 8).45
To return to my earlier point, although aristotle uses ‘air’ (aēr) and ‘fire’ 
(pur) liberally to refer to the two main strata of the atmosphere, he lets us 
know both implicitly (e.g., through the addition of hoion to pur: ‘quasi-fire’) 
and explicitly that the outer layer is not quite fire and that what appears to 
be air is not exactly air. Thus, at Meteor. i.3 340b20–32 he cautions us that the 
outermost stratum under the moon is not really fire but a sort of fire (hoion 
pur), since fire as we know it in its common manifestations is an excess of 
heat and a kind of boiling. What makes this passage potentially confusing 
is that aristotle seems to refer to flames (i.e. fire as we experience it here, 
around the center of the universe) as real fire, despite its apparently being 
an excessive form of the simple body that envelops the other strata in our 
sublunary world, whereas the outermost stratum in the sublunary world, 
whose nature displays a certain balance and appears to be paradigmatic fire, 
so to speak, is said to be fiery but not exactly fire.
a somewhat similar contrast is offered in GC ii.3 (at 330b22 ff). Fire 
(again, as we know it) is an excess of heat, whereas ice is an excess of 
cold, freezing and boiling being types of excess (huperbolai, 330b27).46 The 
implication here is likely that the truly simple bodies are somehow more 
 45 it is notable that even aithēr, at least in the vicinity of the sphere of the moon 
(see Meteor. i.3 340b6–10) and of the dry exhalation, is not as uniformly pure as 
it might be taken to be in aristotle.  
 46 Theophrastus too raises the issue of a confusion that people tend to indulge in all 
too readily, namely the confusion between genuine and unmixed elements, on 
the one hand, and mixtures that we call by convention ‘air’, ‘fire’ etc. Theophrastus’ 
remarks (e.g., in the first nine or so sections of his De Igne) are more tantalizing 
than truly promising, as they are not followed up by a concentrated effort to 
elucidate such confusions, but by vague references to other works or by reminders 
of the limited scope of the enterprise at hand; one only wishes we still had 
his treatise on the generation of elements. There are, however, interesting hints 
at what Theophrastus would have to say on this matter. Fire, according to De 
igne, cannot be an element proper, because its ontological condition is parasitic 
upon some substrate – earth, water and air (mixed in various ratios, to be sure), 
but Theophrastus wonders in passing about the possibility of a pure, unmixed 
fire constituting the Sun and other celestial bodies. While i cannot get into a 
detailed analysis of that aporia here, i should note that Bodnár (2002) comes 
as close to explaining those very difficult segments (such as sections 4–6) as it 
seems reasonably possible and contributes substantially to the discussion about 
potential discrepancies between Theophrastus and the Stagirite, concluding 
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moderate versions of what we take to be earth, water, air and fire (or rather 
that the latter are exaggerations of the former). The truly simple bodies are 
not fire, air etc., but fiery (puroeides), airy (aeroeides) and so on.47 aristotle 
adds that fire and earth, being at the periphery and at the center of the 
sublunary sphere respectively, are most pure (eilikrinestata), whereas air 
and water, being positioned between the other two bodies, are more mixed 
(memigmena mallon). That air and water are ‘mixed’ seems to foreshadow the 
Meteor. i discussion about exhalations, atmis – vapor or moist exhalation – 
being a sort of hybrid, not quite pure water or pure air, except that in Meteor. 
i the outermost layer in the sublunary world is the dry exhalation that is 
both smoky (that is, earthy) and fiery, which does not fully square with the 
claim in GC about the purity of fire, understood as the stuff that borders on 
the aithēr.
all this may sound more perplexing than illuminating. Still, even if 
aristotle’s account of the relationship between the simple bodies and the 
exhalations is fairly turbid, he provides sufficient clues for us to accept 
that the exhalations are not somehow fundamentally different from the 
four (sublunary) simple bodies. Let us consider this passage, at Meteor. i.3 
340b24–27:
But we must understand that the part of what we call air [tou legomenou 
aeros] which immediately surrounds the earth is moist and hot because 
it is vaporous and contains exhalations from the earth, but that the part 
above this is hot and dry. For vapor is naturally moist and cold and 
exhalation hot and dry: and vapor is potentially like water, exhalation 
like fire [kai estin atmis men dunamei hoion hudōr, anathumiasis de 
dunamei hoion pur].
it is reasonably clear in this context that, while the exhalations are 
somewhat different from water (and, we should add, air) and from fire, their 
constitution is still close enough to the aforementioned simple bodies, so 
that they have the capacity (dunamis) to be transformed into them under 
the right conditions. The moist exhalation becomes water when it is cooled 
down enough for the vapor to condense into water proper; the dry exhalation 
becomes fire proper when its disposition to burst into flames is actualized.
Now, what exactly does it mean for, say, the dry exhalation to be close 
in its constitution to fire without being fire proper? it does not appear to 
plausibly that those discrepancies are not quite the gaping chasm that some 
make them out to be.
 47 here i agree with Joachim (1926), 217 and with Williams (1982), 161.
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stand quite in the same relationship to fire as, for example, air or earth 
do in aristotle’s various accounts of elemental transformation; otherwise, 
he would have called the dry exhalation ‘air’ or ‘fire’ or maybe even ‘earth’, 
or a combination of these, without much reservation or any qualification. 
The dry exhalation emanates from the earth when the latter is heated up 
by the sun; it is ‘smoky’ (kapnōdē, Meteor. i.4 341b10) and ‘windy’ but it is 
also highly combustible (it is called hupekkauma or flammable stuff at i.4 
341b19) and the heat produced as a result of the movement of the sun (and, 
to a smaller degree, of the other heavenly bodies and spheres) easily ignites 
the dry anathumiasis to give rise to presumably sublunary phenomena 
such as shooting stars, comets and the like (Meteor. i.4 341b13–24; cf. i.3 
340b12–14).
Olympiodorus’ comments on the nature of the exhalations are 
particularly useful. in an attempt to argue for the continuity between 
books i–iii and book iV of the Meteorology, he takes the exhalations to be 
intermediary (metaxu) stages in the mutual transformations of the so-called 
elements (see, e.g., 16.15–22) or even intermediaries analogous to the so-
called elements (at 314.16 ff. he notes that the smoky exhalation corresponds 
to – analogei – earth and the vapor corresponds to water; cf. 319.11–12). at 
266.20 ff. he writes that vapor, atmis, is in a way water: when condensed, vapor 
reveals its watery (rather than airy) side; when not condensed, it is water in 
potentiality, as it is made of finer particles (it is leptomeresteron)48 than actual 
water (270.29).49 While this interpretation sounds remarkably sensible (and 
 48 Cf. aristotle’s own use of leptomeres in GC ii.2, at 330a2, in a discussion about 
the emergence of new properties in a compound that comes about as a result 
of mixis. For evidence of a corpuscularian view of matter in early Peripatetic 
science and philosophy, see Theophrastus’ opuscula, especially his De Igne, e.g., 
sections 46 and 49, where the deployment of a quasi-technical terminology 
including the adjectives leptomeres and mikromeres (literally, consisting of fine 
or small parts) seems to underscore his interest in precisely such an approach to 
the study of matter. i would not exclude the possibility that Theophrastus – who 
made use of such features somewhat more consistently – might have influenced 
aristotle, rather than the other way around, but this can only remain a matter 
of conjecture. 
 49 Olympiodorus seems to imply an unnecessarily corpuscular view of matter in 
aristotle’s natural philosophy, but this impression of flagrant misinterpretation 
is mitigated if we consider aristotle’s rather curious references to minuscule 
masses (onkoi). Newman (2006), 13, 28, 65–68 and Chalmers (2009), 65–69 are 
right to point out the discreet but quite real corpuscularian or granular aspect 
of aristotle’s theory of matter in Meteor. iV, since some of his explanations of 
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seems supported by the fact that aristotle presents the constitution of metals 
and rocks both in terms of exhalations, in Meteor. iii, and in terms of earth 
and water or dry and moist, in Meteor. iV), given aristotle’s treatment of the 
exhalations in Meteor. i–iii, it does not appear reconcilable with aristotle’s 
own firm objection (GC ii.5 332a19–26) to the possibility that there might be 
intermediaries between the four sublunary simple bodies.
accordingly, a plausible answer, i believe, is that the dry exhalation 
is quite simply earth in the process of becoming fire. in other words, it 
should be placed in aristotle’s table of elements, so to speak, somewhere 
close to the ‘dry’ extreme along the continuum between moist and dry and 
also somewhere closer to the ‘hot’ extreme than to the ‘cold’ one, along the 
continuum between these two opposites. as for atmis or the moist exhalation, 
it seems to be water in the process of becoming air (or the other way around, 
as the case may be) and is thus to be placed close to the ‘moist’ extreme along 
the dry-moist continuum and maybe rather close to the cold extreme along 
the cold-hot continuum, but further away from ‘theoretical water’ than what 
aristotle calls the forms of water, eidē hudatos.
III. What accounts for the fact that certain  
uniform stuffs consist, say, just of earth and still  
have different dispositions?
My inquiry into the nature of the homoeomers has bearing on the emergence 
of physical dispositions (i.e. dispositions that hinge partly on some particular 
microstructure) as well. if it is indeed possible, according to aristotle, that 
there are different stuffs each made of one element (e.g., salt, baked clay, 
amber and soda, each consisting only of earth), one may wonder what exactly 
accounts for the fact that they have different properties (for instance, soda 
is soluble, baked clay is not, 384b1–2). Part of the answer lies, i think, in my 
previous comments: forms of earth and of water may be defined to some 
extent according to where they are situated along the continua between hot 
and cold, dry and moist. i would further propose, however, that we should 
also look for an answer in their ‘physical’ – rather than merely ‘chemical’ – 
constitution. Mostly in ch. 9 we are offered ample and detailed explanations 
dispositional properties such as the combustibility of wood are explained in 
terms of poroi or invisible channels of different types (arranged according to 
different patterns in solid homoeomers), and of particles that can or cannot 
enter such poroi. 
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of the behavior of uniform stuffs centered on the notion of poroi50 or tiny 
channels that pervade solid bodies. The microstructure of some stuff (which 
is among its categorical properties – along with the ratio between its original 
ingredients, and perhaps the amount and type of heat they contain etc.) can 
be revealed by some of its dispositions and can implicitly account for those 
dispositional differentiae. Soda, for instance is thoroughly pervaded by poroi 
(385b23) – in a way in which baked clay is not – and this accounts for the fact 
that soda is easily soluble in water.
it is noteworthy that the exact sequence or progression from primary 
dunameis and elementary stuffs to homoeomers and implicitly to the 
emergence of secondary or derivative dispositions is sometimes left to the 
intuition of the reader of Meteor. iV, instead of being subjected to keen 
analysis and overt explanations. in chs. 8–9, for instance, aristotle describes 
the (micro)structural characteristics (poroi of a certain diameter – allowing 
water or only fire in etc.), arranged longitudinally or otherwise), which, along 
with a certain chemical composition (e.g., predominance of earth), explain 
some of the intrinsic dispositions listed there: fragility, flammability etc. We 
can safely assume that the poroi and the interstices in most solid uniform 
bodies are caused by thermic reactions, namely by the movements instigated 
by internal or external heat (whether dry or moist), but exactly how that 
is supposed to happen is nearly impossible to grasp with confidence for a 
reader of Meteor. iV or is, at best, shrouded in a web of rather opaque hints. 
Yet, upbraiding aristotle for the insufficiency of his account could be a rather 
misdirected exercise. he was certainly aware that his scientific antennae 
could not possibly help him to provide complete and enlightening proofs for 
every ‘chemical’ phenomenon and that he had to strike a balance, precarious 
though it might have been, between observation and speculation. The thesis 
that solid bodies are pervaded by invisible poroi is never quite demonstrated 
in Meteor. iV, but the apparent plausibility of the inference (from the behavior 
of fragile, splittable, flammable etc. bodies) that they contain such capillaries 
seems to supplant the need for a more cogent proof. The text of Meteor. iV 
8 and 9 shows little hesitation in invoking the poroi – a layer of explanatory 
machinery additional to that of the elementary qualities.
 50 On poroi (and a possible contradiction with GC i.8) and on the issue of 
authorship, see, e.g., Lewis (1996), 3–9, Viano (2002), 71–72, Pepe (2002), 31–
33; for aristotle’s own handling of poroi, see GC i.9 and Meteor. iV (especially 
ch. 9). 
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it is likely such a physical organization that could partly explain (together 
with the position, so to speak, of the forms of earth and water along the 
dry-moist and hot-cold continua) why different stuffs such as clay, soda, salt 
etc., while consisting of only one element, can nonetheless exhibit different 
qualities. it is a further question whether this might also explain why, say 
earthenware or a lump of salt preserve their internal cohesion despite their 
complete loss of water and, by the way, against the precepts put forth both in 
GC ii.8 and in Meteor. iV.4 and 10.51
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